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JURIES IN U.S. PATENT CASES:
A COMPARATIVE PORTRAIT OF THE BOUNDARIES OF
DEMOCRACY
M. Neil Browne1
Nancy K. Kubasek2
Alex Q. Jacobs3
“It is clear that juries will necessarily differ in ‘competence,’ but it
is at best incongruous to suggest that a society that sends its citizens
routinely into space could never produce a jury competent to
determine a case some judge might consider too ‘complex’ for
people with ‘common experience’ to decide.”4
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SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (Markey, C.J., additional views). Chief Judge Markey’s defense of juries is
admirable, but his comments here attack a straw man. Few would argue our
society could never produce a competent jury, but some quite reasonably question
whether the legal system can offer a set of capable, non-biased jurors on a
consistent basis. In addition, Markey’s chosen metaphor does little to help his
argument, as rocket scientists and astronauts are far from typical citizens. Both
occupations are extremely specialized and require massive amounts of both
education and experience—practically the opposite concept of a civil jury
consisting of “average” lay citizens.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The optimal boundaries of democracy are persistently
challenged even in countries like the United States, with its
relatively long history of democratic traditions. When we suggest
that almost anyone possesses the cognitive and emotional training
and competence to make a particular decision, we are assuming the
complexity of that decision does not require special expertise that
would need to be acquired through training and reflective
experience. Consequently, expertise and democracy have always
been awkward roommates.
Expertise is increasingly seen in many contexts as just another
point of view.5 Multiple factors have complemented the natural
drive of our egos to see our conclusions as just as good as those of
anyone else. For instance, our news industry has emerged as a 24hour entertainment venue where argumentative fervor is a
replacement for slow, reflective sharing of diverse observations. 6
Another factor in the burgeoning disrespect for expertise is the ease
with which anyone can now use the Internet to cherry pick reasons
to buttress whatever conclusion people wish to believe. Finally,
student appraisal of what happens on campus is now protected
5

See TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE C AMPAIGN AGAINST
ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017). This compelling and
important book discusses the causes and dangers of the idea that all opinions are
worthy of equal respect. In other words, whatever method of knowing a person
uses, his or her conclusions deserve an identical hearing. That idea is consistent
with direct election of Supreme Court Justices, the evaluation of middle school
students by their teachers, and accepting the conclusions of celebrities who
counsel us to refrain from vaccinating our children for measles.
6
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2013). This magisterial
comparison of (1) the dangers associated with speedy thinking that draws upon a
huge array of cognitive biases and (2) the rich harvest from slow, systematic, and
contextualized thinking should give pause to any consumer of the fever-pitch
pronouncements that are the lifeblood of major contemporary news channels.
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because of the emergence of customer satisfaction models in higher
education; in turn, this has an immediate impact on university
revenue.7
This article aspires to encourage legislators and jurisprudential
scholars to re-examine the optimal boundaries of democracy. The
complexity of patent disputes provides an illustration of a legal
setting that almost all of us would agree is highly complex. The idea
of a jury of citizen peers is a hallowed component of the American
legal system. But principles and high-sounding abstractions cry out
for cautious application because pursuing them in extreme forms
risks trampling on conflicting principles. For example, we may be
devoted to free speech, but a shout of “Fire!” reminds us public
safety should not be sacrificed on an altar of devotion to robust
public discourse. An examination of the adjudication process for
patent cases in multiple countries provides us with a laboratory in
which alternative attitudes toward the proper scope of democracy
are modelled.
II. THE AMERICAN INFATUATION WITH THE SKILLS OF JURORS
Chief Judge Markey’s comments in SRI International v.
Matsushita Electric Corp. reveal obvious disdain for those who
question the capabilities of lay juries, even in complicated patent
cases. Throughout his decade-long tenure as head of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”), Markey consistently
promoted the “fundamental Constitutional right” to a jury in civil
cases—including patent trials. 8 His opinions contributed to the rapid
7

See Bea González, Students as Customers: The New Normal in Higher
Education, THE EVOLLLUTION (Oct. 28, 2016), https://evolllution.com/
attracting-students/customer_service/students-as-customers-the-new-normal-inhigher-education/. As public support for higher education has dwindled,
universities are more and more forced to embrace market logic as their
institutional organizational framework. Revenue projections are then based on
pleasing the customer base, providing the students with the housing, curriculum,
and recreational opportunities they prefer. That students may need guidance from
trained professionals in reshaping their preferences to match their long-run needs
is seen as unfairly paternalistic. The students’ desires are accepted as the major
driver for the shaping of university services.
8
John R. Alison, The Role of Juries in Managing Patent Enforcement: Judge
Howard Markey’s Opinions and Writings, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
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rise of jury trials for such cases in U.S. district courts.9 In addition
to Judge Markey’s enthusiastic support, the creation of standardized
rules for jury instructions and interrogatories caused an increase in
jury trials for patent cases. 10 While the right to a jury trial has been
preserved since the creation of the Bill of Rights,11 juries themselves
were relatively uncommon in American patent litigation until the
last few decades. In 1978, just over eight percent of all U.S. patent
trials were argued before a jury; 12 by 2011, lay juries participated in
almost seventy-five percent of cases involving patent disputes.13
This massive increase in the number of jury trials, combined
with the special complexity of patent litigation, 14 begs the question:
are juries competent enough to make fair decisions in long, highly
technical patent suits? Chief Judge Markey’s position was clear: he
dismissed the idea that juries were incapable of understanding
complicated scientific and technical issues. 15 Instead, Markey
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 41, 41–43 (2009) (“[B]y the time he left the bench in 1989, jury
trials in patent cases had become common, and now are the norm.”).
9
See id. at 41.
10
See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1673, 1674–75 (2013) (revealing the surprising increase in the use of juries
in patent trials over the last several decades).
11
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).
12
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 211 (1998).
13
See Mark A. Lemley, et al., Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes
in Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q. J. 169, 172–73 (2013) (explaining that of the 624
patent trials between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2011, 466 trials, or 74.7%,
were tried before juries).
14
See Jordan M. Halle, Avoiding Those Wearing Propeller Hats: The Use of
Blue Ribbon Juries in Complex Patent Litigation, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 435–
36 (2014) (“However, while inventions as complicated as an engine the size of a
single molecule have been developed, the juries tasked with analyzing claims to
patents for such technology have not changed. At trial, the parties are likely to call
expert witnesses to attempt to clarify complex scientific breakthroughs, but the
matter discussed may be so far beyond the comprehension, training, and
experience of the lay jury that fact-finding is rendered impossible.”).
15
Alison, supra note 8, at 43–44. Markey argued juries were already proven
effective in the courtroom for civil and criminal cases involving complex fact
patterns and legal applications, and thus a complexity exception for patent cases
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promoted better trial organization, 16 such as simplification of how
evidence is introduced to the jury, as well as creation of more
specific verdicts as a way to focus jury attention on “key issues.” 17
The backbone of Markey’s support for the use of juries 18 is the
Seventh Amendment.19 He firmly believed the Bill of Rights
guaranteed the right to a trial by jury no matter the circumstance,
and for this reason he rebuffed court suggestions that some cases
demanded a “complexity exception[]”20 to skirt around use of
juries.21

was unnecessary. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107,
1130–31 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
16
Alison, supra note 8, at 45. We have little doubt increasing procedural clarity
in the courtroom would help juries (and perhaps even some judges). However, the
effect of such changes is limited by the extent to which they represent a problem
in the legal system. If deeper issues exist—such as the presence of natural
limitations of civil juries’ capabilities—all the clarity improvements in the world
may not have much effect, and in that case Markey’s argument would be little
more than wishful thinking.
17
Id.; see also SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1128–32 (providing additional views of
Chief Justice Markey).
18
Alison, supra note 8, at 45 (quoting Markey in SRI Int’l as arguing, “[J]udges
are nowhere authorized to exercise their personal predilection by revising or
repealing the Seventh Amendment . . . To permit a judicial interpretation of a
constitutional provision that destroys another constitutional provision is to place
at risk the entire Constitution.”). While Chief Judge Markey is far from the only
supporter of lay juries, his high-profile position and the extent to which he wrote
about preserving Seventh Amendment rights suggest his arguments are
reasonable representations of thinkers who advocate relatively strict interpretation
of the Constitution.
19
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
20
Daniel P. Sullivan, Must the Jury Reach a Verdict? The Constitutionality of
Eliminating Juries in Patent Trials by Creating an Article I Tribunal, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 754, 765–66 (2008) (“Over the last thirty years,
the courts have begun to invoke a complexity exception, where a judge may
remove a complex issue of law or fact from a jury and decide the issue herself.”);
see also James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh
Amendment Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1032 (2010)
(analyzing the historical contexts during the creation of the Bill of Rights that
would allow for a complexity exception in today’s common law).
21
Alison, supra note 8, at 45–46. Chief Judge Markey also fought against the
“injection of ‘expertise’” and specialization into the American legal system. Id.
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Other commentators interpret the Seventh Amendment not as a
guaranteed right applicable to all situations, but as a safeguard to
preserve a basic democratic element of the American judicial
system.22 Support for this argument comes from the ambiguous
language used in the Amendment itself, 23 as well as circumstances
surrounding its creation. 24 Various courts have put forth similar
justifications in the past few decades to carve out exceptions to the
jury trial right.25
Of these court decisions, two stand out as highly skeptical of
jury capabilities. In the first, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
22
See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (explaining that “[o]nly
those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the
essence of the system of trial by jury” are preserved by the Seventh Amendment);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (“[T]he Amendment was
designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental
elements.”). In other words, some argue the right to a jury trial is not mandated in
every civil case; rather, it merely must be available as part of the legal system at
large.
23
Sullivan, supra note 20, at 755 (explaining that “[w]hile the Framers all
agreed on the importance of a civil jury, there was no consensus as to the extent
of this right,” and further, the final amendment was “purposefully vague” due to
the Framers’ “inability to determine which cases were (and were not) appropriate
for juries to decide . . .”); see also Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret
the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008–
12 (1992) (discussing the establishment of the Seventh Amendment right).
24
One source discusses:
In the end, the debate returns to the fundamental question: What
right to trial by jury in suits at common law was preserved by
the Seventh Amendment? If a complex civil case in 1791 in
England would either not have gone to a jury at all or would
have gone to a form of jury that is today unlawful (the jury of
experts, the special jury of merchants), it follows that a
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment should be
constitutionally unobjectionable.
Oldham, supra note 20, at 1053 (emphasis in original); see also Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289,
289–91 (1966).
25
Sullivan, supra note 20, at 765 (“Courts have been able to whittle away a
right to a jury trial because the right to a civil jury trial is not fundamental and
because the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee
that juries are the sole fact finders.”).
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Litigation26 that it was constitutional to remove a case from the
jury’s responsibility if the complexities of the case were so great
they raised due process concerns. 27 Years later the Supreme Court
ruled in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,28 that claim
construction—the process by which the patent claims at issue are
carefully interpreted and defined 29—was a matter of law, not fact,
and thus was to be decided not by juries but by the courts. 30 Many
commentators agree claim construction is an extremely important
part of a case’s outcome, 31 so the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Markman yields more crucial questions about which aspects of
patent trials, if any, are suitable for jury deliberation.
Concerns about jury responsibilities extend further if one
examines the performance of district court judges in patent cases.
These generalist judges immerse themselves in the legal system
and—by nature of their job—are much more comfortable with a
variety of legal terms and procedures than a lay person. Hence, one
would expect to see this experience reflected in patent litigation at
the district court level. However, many generalist trial judges
display a severely inadequate understanding of the criteria for the
Daubert test, which is essential for admitting proper scientific
26

In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1980).
27
Id. at 1084. But see Alison, supra note 8, at 45 (invoking Chief Judge
Markey’s discussion in SRI Int’l regarding the slippery slope of judicial decisions
that attempt to point out conflicts between Constitutional Amendments).
28
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
29
Greg Reilly, Patent “Trolls” and Claim Construction, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1045, 1045 (2016) (“Patent claim construction—the interpretation of the
short paragraphs (or ‘claims’) at the end of the patent that define the scope of the
patentee’s rights—is ‘overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in
litigation.’”).
30
Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
31
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (“[T]o decide what the claims mean is nearly always to
decide the case.”); see Reilly, supra note 29, at 1051 (“Claim construction is
widely recognized as the most important step in patent litigation. It is a threshold
step for virtually every other issue in a patent case.”); see also Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) (arguing the results of claim construction frequently
predict the outcome of the case).
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evidence from expert witnesses. 32 Because the validity of such
scientific evidence becomes crucial in deciding many patent cases,
the fact that few state trial court judges can establish the criteria for
accepting such evidence is worrisome. To argue by extension, if
these judges—with strong legal backgrounds and years of
experience as actual judges—have trouble identifying valid expert
witnesses, how would a lay jury have a fighting chance of doing a
credible job accomplishing the same daunting task? And if both
sides present opposing experts who seem to make valid points, by
what prior skills or knowledge are jury members expected to weigh
the credibility and accuracy of specialized scientists and
technicians?
Recent empirical evidence further advances the case against lay
juries. One study reveals a twelve percent advantage for the patentee
in cases decided by juries versus those presided over by a judge. 33
Another describes jurors as more apt to sympathetically support
small entities or individual inventors in disputes against big
companies.34 Still more evidence suggests juries are less proficient
at sifting through multi-issue cases and deciding each claim on its
own merits; rather, jury members more often side with one party for
32

Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem,
5 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1537–41, 1557 (2017) (suggesting that trial judges are in
a unique position to keep junk science out of the courtroom yet routinely fail to
do so due to factors such as lack of scientific knowledge and reliability on mental
heuristics). The article also notes judges statistically have a massive bias toward
admitting prosecution experts over defense experts, with 95.8% of the former
being admitted at trial versus 7.8% of the latter. Id. See generally Keelah E. G.
Williams & Michael J. Saks, Why Don’t the Gatekeepers Guard the Gates?
Comments Prompted by Edmond, 36 ADEL. L. REV. 109 (2015) (exploring the
failure of trial judges to adequately understand and apply Daubert and examining
the judicial worldviews that would lead to this failure).
33
See Lemley et al., supra note 13, at 173 (detailing that from 2000 to 2011,
patentees succeeded in roughly 63% of cases decided by juries, but only 51% of
suits heard by judges for a sixteen-year period).
34
Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 81 (2007)
(“The data, however, show that in jury trials from 1990–2003, individuals won
74% of patent lawsuits against corporations. There was no similar discrimination
in bench trials. In fact, corporations were slightly more successful with judges
when their adversaries were individuals. Individuals prevailed against
corporations in only 46% of bench trials.”).
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all issues in a patent suit. 35 Besides these patent-specific studies, a
vast array of social science research on the questionable
effectiveness of lay juries is more than enough to raise serious
concerns of fairness—even for the most ardent advocate of lay
participation in the law. 36
III. IMPACT OF INEQUALITY ON THE WISDOM OF USING
AMERICAN JURIES FOR PATENT PROTECTION
Another danger in maintaining the current state of American
patent litigation is the vastly unequal distribution of power between
large, resource-rich corporations and individual entities. 37 For
example, consider the fact that the “vast majority of licensing
revenues are collected by large firms” 38 and “small companies are
less likely to litigate to protect their patents.” 39 One might infer small
35

Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 nn.7–8 (2000) (“The data
suggests that judges are statistically more capable of resolving cases issue-byissue instead of case-by-case.”).
36
See THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL., JUDGE-JURY AGREEMENT IN CRIMINAL
CASES: A PARTIAL REPLICATION OF KALVEN AND ZEISEL’S THE AMERICAN JURY 343
(Cornell Law Faculty Publications 2005) (Partially replicating Kalven and
Zeisel’s The American Jury (1966, Little and Brown), which found that judges
and juries give conflicting verdicts for the same cases about 20% of the time. This
study found similar results. This replication also found that as evidence gets more
complex and/or technical, juries disagree with judges even more often (as much
as 54% in high-complexity cases).); see also Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the
Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 4 (2007) (finding that judges
and juries disagree about 23% of the time. While these figures tend to favor
agreement between judges and juries, the fact that juries disagree with judges in
almost a quarter of all cases seems to provide a troubling outlook for the fairness
of trials.).
37
Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a
Costly Barrier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184,
184 (2004) (“[I]n today’s legal environment, small businesses and individual
inventors holding patents are placed at a significant disadvantage when their
patents are challenged by large businesses.”).
38
Peter N. Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 641 (2007).
39
Ronspies, supra note 37, at 197; see Richard W. Goldstein & Donika P.
Pentcheva, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION (AIPLA),
LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
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entities are also less likely to file for patents, but this is far from the
case.40 Additionally, the average quality and ingenuity of
individuals’ patents does not appear to be the issue, as one
commentator notes “[o]ver half of the sixty-one most important
innovations of the 20th century came from independent inventors or
small firms.”41 If creativity and originality are not essential causal
factors, why the discrepancy in who benefits from patent protection?
In many instances patent infringement disputes are “make it or
break it” for individuals and small businesses, whereas powerful
corporations often have the capability to survive an unfavorable
judgment—and the capital to prolong a case on appeal for years. 42
The complex nature of patent suits demands lengthy, highly
technical trials, often involving numerous expert witnesses who
only add to the extensive list of legal expenses incurred by both
sides.43 Cases that reach a judgment on the merits may last three to
seven years,44 and by that time changes in the market may have

2015 (2015), https://www.accmeetings.com/AM16/faculty/files/Article_482_
7928_LitSpend___AIPLA_2015_Report.pdf [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT]
(calculating that the median cost of litigating a patent infringement case where the
amount at stake is less than $1 million to be $600,000).
40
Julia Cronin-Gilmore, Exploring Marketing Strategies in Small Business, 1
J. MARKETING DEV. & COMPETITIVENESS 6, 96 (2012) (“Small businesses drive
the economy and sustain the technological lead in the global marketplace resulting
in one-third of all new patents issued.”).
41
Ronspies, supra note 37, at 193.
42
Grace Heinecke, Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent Troll Model Is
Fundamentally at Odds with the Patent System’s Goal of Innovation and
Competition, 3 FORDHAM L. REV. 84 (2015) (describing how an entire industry of
“patent trolls” has sprung up and how these trolls purchase large numbers of broad
patents, usually from bankruptcy proceedings at a discounted price, and use the
patents for the sole purpose of bullying small firms into paying licensing fees for
using technology similar to that contained in the patent; if the small firm refuses
to pay, the patent troll firm can sue and use its greater amount of capital to outlast
the small firm in litigation.).
43
See ExpertPages, 2016 Expert Witness Fees & Practices Survey (2016),
http://www.debow.com/documents/EP-2016Survey-ExecSummary-FinalArchive.pdf (showing that the average hourly rate of an expert witness is $341 per
hour).
44
Detkin, supra note 38, at 640.
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already rendered the patent in question obsolete.45 For the solitary
inventor, this can be devastating, especially because the patent suit
itself is often time-consuming and draining—leaving little time for
developing new ideas or technologies that can be patented and
licensed.46
Large entities often can easily divert resources to fight legal
battles without hindering market performance or impeding
development of future products, but small inventors do not share this
advantage.47 Even if an individual manages to find a law firm willing
to take her case on contingency48 and endures years of grueling court
hearings, it is far from guaranteed she will receive appropriate
compensation for successfully defending her patent rights. 49
Assuming the final decision awards the individual patent holder
with a reasonable award for lost profit due to infringement, a
substantial portion of that award—perhaps several million dollars’
worth50—necessarily reimburses her team of lawyers for years of
legal work. After accounting for all legal fees, including the costs of
expert witnesses (to persuade the court of the patent’s validity) and
45
Ronspies, supra note 37, at 196 n.85 (quoting James V. Grimaldi, After
Historic Flight, Wrights Went to Court, W ASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2003, at E01
[therein quoting a letter from Wilbur Wright to his lawyer: “Unnecessary delays
by stipulation of counsel have already destroyed fully three fourths of the value
of our patent . . . . The opportunities of the last two years will never return
again.”]).
46
See id. at 201 (describing the difficulties encountered by small businesses and
individual inventors in trying to stay afloat while also “devot[ing] substantial
portions of . . . time to the defense of a patent”). Large corporations have the
benefit of in-house counsel which can lead to “lower litigation costs.”
47
The economies of scale are clear: an entity with a yearly income of $50
million can more readily afford an expensive patent case than an inventor who
makes $50,000 a year. Id. at 185–86.
48
Often contingency represents an unappealing option for lawyers because
damages in patent suits are often “difficult to calculate” or predict—and for
patents which haven’t made it to market yet, the risk is even higher as the
profitability of the patent is unproven. Id. at 197–198.
49
Id. at 199 (“[S]mall-entity patentees may find themselves granted an award
of lost profits only to see it equaled or exceeded by the costs incurred during
litigation.”).
50
Patent litigants in the United States can expect to pay anywhere from
$600,000 to $5,000,000 to fight a case through appeal. See AIPLA REPORT, supra
note 39, at 37.

210

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 199

at least one certified public accountant (to testify as to the patent’s
market value in terms of lost profit), 51 the individual inventor may
find herself with little to no reward for retaining her intellectual
property.52
In sum, the current legal landscape for patent law rewards those
with deep pockets and the luxury of excessive patience—the very
two advantages seldom possessed by small entities and individual
creators. The consequences of inequality in patent litigation are
clear. As one commentator remarks, “These aspects of patent
litigation can have negative social effects, including the relative
chilling of innovative activity . . . .”53 Without improvements to the
efficiency and accuracy of the current system, unhealthy power
imbalances will linger in American patent law.
IV. PATENT LITIGATION AROUND THE WORLD
A number of countries—including Japan, Great Britain,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Thailand—have implemented some
type of judicial structure that explicitly handles intellectual property
cases. Each system differs in scope and effectiveness, but each of
these countries saw fit to give special attention to the highly complex
and technical nature of patent litigation.
A. Patent Litigation in Japan
Recent reforms in Japanese intellectual property litigation
naturally invite comparisons with the current patent trial system in
the United States.54 Strengthening the comparison is the fact that
51

See generally ExpertPages, supra note 43.
See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 39; see also Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll”
Check? A Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1775 (2017) (arguing that the cost, complexity, and length of the average
patent case creates a chilling effect on small inventors seeking patents at all, let
alone litigating patents).
53
Cohen, supra note 52, at 1794.
54
Japanese reformers borrowed ideas from the U.S. patent system in their quest
for increased efficiency. However, the Japanese purposefully avoided imitating
the exact structure of American patent litigation, instead stretching beyond the
U.S. system in an attempt to make the reforms specific to Japanese culture and
society. In many respects the Japanese legal reforms are broader than any in recent
U.S. history (including the creation of the CAFC). See Toshiko Takenaka, Success
52
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both U.S. and Japanese trials rely on a form of the adversary
system.55 Japan has an unusual combination of code in which “the
Continental European system is maintained” while “the best
characteristics of Anglo-American law have been adopted.” The
“adoption of the adversary system in the court procedure” and a layjudge system for certain types of cases that acts “much like the jury
system adopted in the United States and elsewhere” 56 mean any
comparison between the two countries’ legal procedures, while not
synonymous, is arguably more compatible than any attempted
parallel between the U.S. and a purely civil law country.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the two legal
systems is Japan’s lack of jury trials in the traditional American
style.57 For this article, the absence of a jury is helpful, as we are
interested in analyzing the effectiveness of patent courts with a
reduced or eliminated role for the jury.
However, a lack of lay juries in civil cases is not the only reason
Japan’s revised legal structure is worth studying; both Japan and the
United States have a long-lasting, deeply embedded tradition of

or Failure? Japan’s National Strategy on Intellectual Property and Evaluation of
its Impact from the Comparative Law Perspective, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 379 (2009).
55
Use of the adversary system differentiates Japan from many other civil law
countries. See generally SUP. CT. OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
JAPAN (2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9oy8uuh (providing an in-depth look at
criminal trials in Japan and the basis of the Japanese legal system found in the
systems of other countries).
56
Id. at 5–7.
57
See Randall R. Rader, The Comparative Moot Court with US and Japanese
Patent Law 37, www.win-cls.sakura.ne.jp/pdf/2/36-37.pdf (“[T]he Japanese trial
resembles a US trial without a jury.”). However, as of May 2009, the Japanese
conduct criminal trials using the “saiban-in,” a mixed jury system combining three
judges and six lay jurors on a single panel. Lay jurors have an increased role in
comparison to the responsibilities of jury members in the United States, as the
Japanese jury can ask questions directly to witnesses. See Robert E. Precht, Japan,
the Jury - Opinion - International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/01/opinion/01iht-edprecht.3738928.html.
Because the function of Japanese patent courts is unaltered by the addition of a
jury to criminal trials, any further discussion of the saiban-in is beyond the scope
of this article.
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courts headed by generalist judges. 58 Specialization is the exception,
not the rule. Both countries highly value judicial leaders with a
broad array of knowledge, 59 thus any divergence from a generalized
court system deserves our attention. Japan’s rapid embrace of
specialized patent courts counts as a noteworthy deviation, but these
changes inspire a few questions: Why the strong desire to reform
patent litigation? Why now? And why so quickly?
1. Reform of Patent Protection in Japan
Japan’s economy suffered greatly throughout the 1990s.60 With
the new millennium approaching and no end in sight for its
economic troubles, Japan sought to transform from a primarily
industrial and manufacturing based economy to one based on
information.61 One of the key elements identified in such a
transformation was a much greater importance placed on promoting
and protecting intellectual property. 62 Having identified IP as a
weakness and a key area of concern, Japan reformed its judicial
58

Most Japanese judges train and perform as generalists, and many have no
prior specialized knowledge of intellectual property before they arrive in the IP
division. See Judge Shinohara Katsumi, A Retrospective and a Prospective Look
at the First Year of the Intellectual Property High Court, 31 A.I.P.P.I., Sept. 2006
[hereinafter Retrospective]; see also Judge Shinohara Katsumi, Outline of the
Intellectual Property High Court of Japan, 30 A.I.P.P.I., May 2005, at 131
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/200505.pdf [hereinafter Outline] (“In the
United States, there seems to be a strong tendency to pick judges with wide
knowledge and experience, with the so-called generalist preferred to the
specialist.”).
59
See Outline, supra note 58.
60
See Naoyuki Yoshino & Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, Effectiveness of the
Easing of Monetary Policy in the Japanese Economy, Incorporating Energy
Prices, 14 J. COMP. ASIAN DEV. 227, 228–29 (2015) (describing the conditions
surrounding Japan’s recession and the country’s struggles to spark economic
growth).
61
See EDWARD J. LINCOLN, ARTHRITIC J APAN: THE SLOW PACE OF ECONOMIC
REFORM (2001) (describing the conditions surrounding Japan’s recession and the
country’s struggles to spark economic growth).
62
See History, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT. (2005), http://www.ip.courts.go.jp
/eng/aboutus/history/index.html (giving a comprehensive history of IP courts in
Japan, including recommendations from the “Strategic Council on Intellectual
Property” which suggested intellectual property should be one of Japan’s “top
priorities”).
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system to ensure greater quality and speed of litigation in patent
cases (as well as those involving other IP, such as trademarks and
copyrights).63
Japanese courts have incorporated several Intellectual Property
Divisions for almost sixty years, 64 but it wasn’t until 2004 that
Japanese officials amended the national district court structure and
removed patent case jurisdiction from almost all district courts
except those in Tokyo and Osaka. 65 One year later, the IP High Court
was established as a unique branch of the Tokyo High Court. 66 Both
judicial reforms were introduced, discussed, and implemented as
part of a concerted effort to “reinforce the system for resolving IP
cases with more expertise” and “ensure more effective and speedy
trial proceedings in IP cases.” 67 The IP High Court is roughly
analogous to the CAFC, as both are appeals courts with national
jurisdiction over patent litigation. 68 Both courts’ powers are held in
check by their respective Supreme Courts, although in practice, the
relatively small number of cases accepted by each Supreme Court
means both the IP High Court and CAFC are often the last court of
appeal.69 Despite these similarities, several important factors
63

See Judge Toshiaki Iimura, Intellectual Property Infringement Litigations
and Recent Movement toward System Reforms, INTELL. PROP . HIGH CT. (Sept.
2004),
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/documents/thesis/thes_01_thesis_01/
index.html (detailing the process behind the reforms and the creation of the IP
High Court).
64
See Outline, supra note 58, at 131 (“The half-century long history of the
intellectual property division . . . of the Tokyo High Court opens a new page with
the start of the Intellectual Property High Court as a kind of ‘special branch’
within the Tokyo High Court as of April 1, 2005.”).
65
See Chief Judge Ryuichi Shitara, Decade History and Future Prospects of
Intellectual Property High Court, INTELL. PROP. HIGH C T. (Apr. 2015),
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/2015syotyoukouen.pdf (noting these two
district courts now have exclusive “first instance” jurisdiction for all civil patent
cases as well as any other intellectual property disputes).
66
See Iimura, supra note 63.
67
History, supra note 62.
68
But see Shitara, supra note 65 (providing that one major difference between
Japanese High Court and the CAFA is Japan’s IP High Court only handles IP
cases (both infringement and validity) whereas the CAFC hears other appeals in
addition to patent disputes).
69
See Outline, supra note 58, at 146.
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distinguish the Japanese IP courtroom as more specialized than its
American counterpart.
2. Embrace of Specialization
First and foremost, the experience of Japan’s intellectual
property judges is considerable. 70 Every patent case funnels through
the IP divisions of just two district courts, resulting in more yearly
patent cases for each IP judge than an American district court judge
might see in a lifetime. 71 Increased repetition yields familiarity with
complicated court procedures and ideally results in higher efficiency
and more reliable case outcomes.72 Judicial experience is further
enhanced by efforts to share case information among the patent
judges of each IP court. In fact, Japan’s IP judges hold monthly
meetings to keep one another abreast of current cases. 73 This
information sharing unifies the IP Division judges and contributes
to greater consistency in court decisions. 74
Another source of consistency is the Grand Panel system, which
was formed as part of the IP High Court. 75 Acting as a court within
a court, the Grand Panel is a five-judge tribunal that meets

70

See Outline, supra note 58, at 137–138; see also Retrospective, supra note
58, at 200 (discussing how Japanese judges, initially trained as generalists,
develop expertise in intellectual property litigation through repeated exposure to
“technical matters” in “highly specialized cases”).
71
“Estimates suggest that a [U.S.] district court judge presides over less than
one patent trial per year on average.” Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States
Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 In
Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor Moore, 10 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 176–77 (2009). In contrast, the IP High Court sees
roughly 600–700 cases per year, split among eighteen judges. See Judge Koichi
Tanaka, IP High Court Judge, Intensified Case Management in Specialized Courts
of Japan (Apr. 2007), http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/vcms_lf/070412.pdf.
72
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73
See Outline, supra note 58, at 146 (“[T]he [IP High Court] judges are required
to be aware of the cases presided over by other judges at all times, especially the
cases pending at other divisions . . . .”).
74
See id. (“[T]he sense of unity . . . is [as] strong as ever before among the
judges belonging to the IP Division.”).
75
See Shitara, supra note 65, at 9 (“It is internationally noteworthy that the High
Court level decisions including Grand Panel judgment and decisions has been
rendered in Japan promptly as a result of efficient proceedings of the court.”).
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irregularly to hear “extremely important matter[s] of law.” 76 Similar
in function to the en banc panel of the CAFC,77 the Grand Panel was
created to provide a cohesive opinion of Japanese patent judges on
important IP issues of the day, without having to wait for a case to
slowly make its way to the Supreme Court on appeal. 78 Grand Panel
decisions—along with the continual sharing of information and
discussion among IP judges—enhance the reliability and
consistency of Japan’s patent courts. 79 In addition, specialization
allows the IP High Court judges to focus on becoming intellectual
property experts. To that end, they participate in continuing
education programs, attend conferences, and even take university
courses to learn more about the process of research and development
in the private sector. 80
3. A System of Experts
Besides the experienced judicial core, Japan’s IP courts are
characterized by their extensive use of scientific and technical
experts.81 While it is unrealistic to expect patent judges without
scientific or technical degrees to maintain a level of specialized
knowledge equal to a person “skilled in the art” of a particular
field,82 patent cases demand judges be temporary experts for the
76

The IP High Court normally serves as an appeals court that decides matters
of fact, with the Supreme Court primarily deciding matters of law. See Outline,
supra note 58, at 146. The Grand Panel is simply a collaborative system for
establishing “reliable rules” earlier in the patent litigation process. Id.
77
Unlike the CAFC’s en banc panel, the Grand Panel does not consist of every
active judge in that court; rather, only five judges are present for each case. Id.
Additionally, as the primary goal of the Grand Panel is to provide reliable and
consistent standards, the judges are required to come to a unanimous decision. See
Retrospective, supra note 58, at 210.
78
See Outline, supra note 58, at 133.
79
See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 211.
80
See id. at 200–01 (describing the various ways in which judges on the IP High
Court “take advantage of opportunities to develop their expertise”).
81
See JUDGE RYUICHI SHITARA, A NEW TREND IN IP LITIGATION (2006) (paper
delivered at The Pan-European IP Summit in Brussels, Belgium),
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/documents/pdf/thesis/061207_08_2.pdf (introducing
the idea of the expert commissioners as “a unique system from [a] comparative
law standpoint”).
82
To clarify, it seems unreasonable and perhaps even far-fetched to expect
judges with little technical expertise to understand a complex biotechnology
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duration of the trial. 83 This scientific expertise requires resources to
bring judges up to speed in a reliable, efficient, and neutral manner.
Two separate entities—research officials and the expert
commissioner system—offer personal assistance to Japanese IP
judges during complex cases.84
Research officials are full-time clerks assigned to an IP
division.85 Each official comes from either the Japanese Patent
Office (“JPO”) or a private patent firm, and each is chosen for
having expertise in a specific technical area. 86 While the extent of
involvement for research officials generally depends on the court
and the specific case in question, 87 their role includes questioning
involved parties and strengthening their understanding before
composing an official opinion for the case judges. 88 The research
officials fill a valuable role in the decision-making process, but in
some twenty percent of all IP cases in Japan, judges require an even
more specific level of advanced expertise to ensure they understand
the particular technical aspects of a claim. 89
Enter the expert commissioner system: as unique as it is helpful,
this group of part-time, court-appointed advisors is composed of
over two hundred experts from a multitude of backgrounds. 90 Unlike
patent with the same expertise as a veteran biologist—and yet, during patent trials
these judges are expected to do just that. Court-provided experts provide an
avenue for judges to quickly and accurately enhance their knowledge in a neutral
manner.
83
See Outline, supra note 58, at 136–37.
84
Id. at 138–40.
85
See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 201.
86
Id. (“Because all research officials sit in a single room, they can easily
exchange information with each other and can deal with technical matters outside
his or her field of expertise.”).
87
Research officials for the IP High Court typically have a more significant role
throughout the case as compared to the Tokyo and Osaka district courts. Id.
88
The opinion may be delivered either orally or via written report. Id.
89
Around forty percent of Japanese patent court cases may have a use for expert
commissioners, but judges feel comfortable with provided evidence in roughly
half of those cases. Id. at 212–13.
90
See Shitara, supra note 81, at 4–5 (providing that expert commissioners are
“chosen from among leading experts of various technical fields, including
university professors, researchers at public organizations or private companies
and patent attorneys”).
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in other countries—such as Germany, where experts are rarely used
and often add extensive time to the length of a case91—the Japanese
eagerly use these scientific and technical professionals to aid patent
judges’ comprehension. At least one expert commissioner is
assigned to intricate cases, and up to three commissioners may work
together, depending on the nature and complexity of a case. 92 These
experts play a significant role in interpreting highly technical
evidence and arguments for the judges. However, it is important to
note statements from expert commissioners may not be used as
actual evidence; rather, a commissioner’s purpose is to help the
judges understand the nature of evidence submitted by both parties. 93
So far, the expert commissioners have been successful in providing
IP judges with the ability to make higher quality, more efficient, and
more confident decisions.94
See GAR YEIN NG, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR THE
EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, WORKING GROUP ON THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE, STUDY
ON THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
MEMBER
STATES
20
(2014),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
534f89eee4b0aedbe40ae270/t/558a6d15e4b0dfba0a2afcc8/1435135253774/3rev
_2014_CEPEJ-GT-QUAL_RoleExperts_en.pdf (introducing experts into the
German patent litigation process causes delays in an estimated 20-50% of cases);
see also Wolfgang von Meibom & Boris Kreye, Germany, 142 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., Sept. 2004, at 39, 40 (revealing that appointment of court experts
“is the exception rather than the rule” in German courts).
92
See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 213 (“An expert commissioner
specializing in a field can be combined with others specializing in the neighboring
fields . . . such collaboration would contribute to higher quality of technical
explanation and smoother case management.”).
93
See Shitara, supra note 81, at 5. (“Although explanations given by expert
commissioners in the proceedings are not competent as evidence in principle, they
are very useful to help the court to deepen its understanding of the invention and
other references involved in the case and to make a decision based on the
evidence.”).
94
See Retrospective, supra note 58, at 213–14 (“[W]ith assistance of expert
commissioners, judges can identify genuine issues among various allegations,
request parties to voluntarily withdraw unnecessary arguments, and focus their
arguments and case on narrowed issues, which contributes to expeditious
proceedings.”). Katsumi goes on to discuss a positive side effect: parties put more
effort into preparing good arguments for cases with expert commissioners
involved. In the end, the added expertise “increases reliability and confidence of
parties in the judiciary.” Id.
91
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4. Results of Reform
Case type

Length,
1998

Length,
2008

% Change

Length,
2016

First-instance IP 25.7
cases in district
courts

13.7

- 53.1%

13.3

Appeals to IP 11.5
High Court from
district courts

7.7

- 67.0%

8.3

District trial + 37.2
appeal to IP High
Court

21.4

- 57.5%

21.6

Appeals to IP 17.2
High Court from
JPO decisions

8.0

- 46.5%

8.0

IP Appeals to any 12.1
appeals court

7.7

- 63.6%

7.8

JAPANESE IP CASES, AVERAGE TIME INTERVALS FROM
COMMENCEMENT TO DISPOSITION, IN MONTHS95
The system has been in place for fifteen years now, and the
results have been promising from the beginning. The length (and
therefore cost) of legal disputes dropped dramatically from 2003 to
2008 and have remained consistent as Japan’s legal reforms
stabilized and its judges gained more experience with court
procedures and found more confidence in their roles as highly
trained specialists.
Japan’s two-part combination of specialized patent courts and
judges and a robust system of scientific and technical experts present
95

Statistics, INTELL. PROP. HIGH CT., http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/
documents/statistics/index.html (providing a database of Japanese patent case
intervals from 1998 to 2016).
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a compelling alternative to expensive, lengthy patent litigation in the
United States. Two additional points strengthen this comparison:
Japan’s tradition of legal generalists, which mirrors the American
preference for “jack of all trades” judges, and the influence of the
American legal system on the recent Japanese reforms. While
Japanese patent litigation may not be perfect, 96 the United States
would certainly do well to investigate the benefits of juryless,
specialized district courts in the context of patent protection.
B. Patent Litigation in Europe
Filing intellectual property lawsuits in Europe is complex, given
no central source exists for the resolution of patent disputes. 97 The
European Patent Office (EPO) primarily accepts, revokes, and
invalidates patents; any infringement cases must be initiated
separately in each European country where the alleged infringement
takes place.98 However, the prospect (and expense) of fighting a
dozen simultaneous battles is enough to give pause to many
patentees, even those with deep pockets, and this strategy makes
even less sense considering the first case’s decision often has
considerable bearing on the same case in other countries around
Europe.99 For these reasons, one common approach is to “test the
96

See Takenaka, supra note 54, at 391–93 (discussing issues such as (1) the
negative effect of the IP High Court on certainty as to patent validity, (2) limited
damages awarded compared to those of the United States, and (3) the extremely
low chance of a Japanese court actually finding infringement). While Takenaka
rightfully criticizes these problems, he also concedes “[t]he Japanese government
was successful in creating a court system more advanced than its U.S. counterpart
in dealing with IP issues.” Id. at 390.
97
See generally Stuart J.H. Graham & Nicolas Van Zeebroeck, Comparing
Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655
(2014) (examining the downsides of the fractured European patent system and
how European policy makers, recognizing these downsides, are in the process of
establishing a unitary patent system for Europe).
98
See European Patent Office, Facts and Figures 2009, EPO 8–9,
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/5ba711cb78950ed3c125
75b500421775/$FILE/epo_facts_and_figures_2009_en.pdf (describing the
EPO’s role in granting patent protection in almost forty countries throughout
Europe, all with a single application).
99
See Naomi Rovnick, German Efficiency Shames Patent Court into Rethink,
THE LAWYER 2 (Aug. 19, 2002) (“[I]f they believe their patents have been
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waters” by filing a single infringement lawsuit in a country that
promises inexpensive proceedings and a quick, definitive
outcome.100
Germany has emerged as the “most popular European
jurisdiction”101 for patent litigation as it offers experienced specialist
judges, streamlined procedures, and comparatively fast decisions—
all of which contribute to lower costs. While IP cases in the United
Kingdom are usually more expensive than those in Germany, the
numbers still pale in comparison to the average expense of taking a
patent case through appeal in the United States. 102 In addition to cost,
both European countries share important similarities regarding
patent litigation, one of which is the use of experienced justices. 103
Specialized judges with large amounts of experience reign in
Europe, whether the legal system is based in civil law (Germany) or
common law (England). German patent infringement disputes are
heard by judges assigned strictly to handle patent cases, and
although these judges may not always have a technical background,
they gain experience quickly due to high case volume and the nature
of specialization. 104 Likewise, specialized judges have decided
patent cases in Britain for decades. 105 Although the UK sees fewer

infringed they will have to bring a case in every European country. But it is that
vital first case that will influence judgments in the rest of Europe.”).
100
One patent lawyer remarked, “[I]f I want an injunction quickly, I’ll often go
to Germany.” Id.
101
German patent courts hear roughly 600 cases a year, whereas during the first
six months of 2002, the UK Patent Court “heard just 26 applications or trials.” Id.
102
One estimate places the cost of an English patent case at anywhere from
$490,000 to $3,365,000, whereas clients would need to spend somewhere
between $600,000 and $5,000,000 to fight a patent dispute through appeal in the
U.S. See Michael Burdon, The UK: Can a High-cost Country Change its Ways?,
WIPO MAG., Feb. 2010, at 6–8; AIPLA REPORT, supra note 39, at 37; see also
von Meibom & Kreye, supra note 91, at 40 (revealing that filing in Germany
might only cost $75,000 to $150,000, depending on case complexity).
103
See generally Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97 (summarizing the
similarities between U.K. and German courts).
104
See von Meibom & Kreye, supra note 91, at 39.
105
While the Patents Court was only created in 1977, anyone disputing a patent
in England over the past sixty years has likely presented their case in front of a
specialized patent judge. See Gitter, supra note 71, at 183 n.70.
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overall patent cases than Germany, 106 all British patent judges have
a technical background. 107
One major difference between the countries arises within their
individual court structures. British patent judges belong to one of
two specialized patent courts—the Patents Court or the Patents
County Court—but both courts utilize identical procedures, share
jurisdiction for all patent-related cases, and hear both infringement
and validity disputes.108 Patent litigation in Germany is bifurcated,
so judges hear either infringement or validity cases, but not both. 109
Adjudication of infringement cases occurs in special “patent
chambers” within the Landgericht, the German equivalent of district
courts, and these hearings are overseen by judges much closer to
generalists in nature. 110 The opposite is true for invalidation
decisions, which are brought in a separate court, the
Bundespatentgericht (hereinafter “German Federal Patent Court”),
and presided over by “judges with both legal and technical
training”.111 Despite these structural differences, both types of patent
disputes are spearheaded by judges experienced with the
complexities of patent litigation. 112 Notably, neither Great Britain
nor Germany employ juries in patent trials, as introducing lay

106

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
Gitter, supra note 71, at 185 (“[S]ome of the judges in the English system
possess a technical degree, and ‘all have technical experience.’”).
108
See id. at 182-85.
109
Katrin Cremers et al., Patent litigation in Europe, 44 EUR. J. L. ECON. 1, 5–
6 (2017) [hereinafter Europe] (“The [Landgericht] have no jurisdiction to decide
on the validity of a patent—neither in form of a defense against a patentee’s claims
for patent infringement nor in form of a (counter-) claim for declaratory judgment
of invalidity. This is referred to as bifurcation of infringement and validity
proceedings. In both patent and utility model infringement proceedings the
infringement court has the discretion to stay the proceedings until parallel
revocation proceedings before EPO, DPMA (Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt)
and BPatG (Bundespatentgericht) have come to a conclusion.”).
110
See generally Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of
the Bifurcated Patent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 221
(2016) [hereinafter Invalid].
111
Id.
112
See id.
107
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participants into either system would likely undermine the
efficiency created by specialization. 113
Such efficiencies are clear given a comparative analysis of trial
costs and lengths. Though England is known as for being an
expensive place for patent litigation, 114 a British patent dispute could
potentially cost as little as one-quarter to one-half of an equivalent
case in the United States. 115 Patent litigation in Germany is even
cheaper,116 and relatively short case lengths make it an extremely
attractive venue for those looking to begin defending their patents
in Europe.117 The sheer number of annual cases in German patent
courts suggests patent holders appreciate the speed and efficiency of
the system.118

113

See id. at 224 n.22 (“A key argument for specialization is that sufficient
judicial expertise with the law as well as with technology is crucial for accurate
decision-making in patent litigation. (cf. Moore, 2001; Pegram, 2000; Kesan and
Ball, 2011). In particular, in order to accurately determine a patent’s validity,
judges require a sound understanding of the relevant, potentially invalidating,
prior art.”). See generally Europe, supra note 109 at 6–7 (discussing the patent
system in four litigation systems including Germany and the UK). Juries are
experienced neither as lawyers nor in patent litigation, and many lack expertise in
even one highly technical field, much less multiple complex areas of study. A
quote from the Honorable Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, commenting on how jury trials have stuck around in American patent law
despite its roots in English common law: “even England stopped having jury trials
in patent cases at the beginning of the last century.” Gitter, supra note 71, at 184
note 82 (citation omitted).
114
Alastair J. McCulloch, Patent Litigation in Europe: The U.K. Returns as a
Forum of Choice, JONESDAY (2006), https://www.jonesday.com/PatentLitigation-in-Europe-The-UK-Returns-as-a-Forum-of-Choice-05-05-2006/.
115
See Burdon, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
116
See von Meibom, supra note 91, at 41.
117
See Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97, at 667 (indicating that German
patent trials usually take 12-18 months to see a judgment, whereas UK trials can
take 24-36 months); see also von Meibom, supra note 91, at 39 (stating that for
infringement cases, it can take up to 9-12 months to receive a first instance
judgment in Germany and a “hearing on the merits” can take less than a day; an
appeal can take 12 to 15 months).
118
See Graham & Zeebroeck, supra note 97, at 667 (If patentees were unhappy
with the speed, quality or consistency of decisions from the German specialized
courts, they would simply take their disputes elsewhere in Europe.).
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One unique factor of the German system is, surprisingly, the rare
use of expert witnesses. 119 While judges have the capability to
appoint a neutral expert as a court aide to understand the important
facts of a case, often German patent judges rely solely on their own
extensive technical capabilities. 120 Arguably this expertise is closely
linked to the nature of the German court system itself. It would be a
stretch to suggest generalist district court judges in America could
ever match the knowledge and efficiency of specialized German
patent judges, but these differences lie primarily in the natural
structure of each country’s legal system. 121
In short, the German courts are directed by two major principles:
specialization and decentralization, i.e., there are several different
types of German courts that handle specific types of cases, and the
rulings these courts give tend not to affect German law as a whole. 122
These are derived primarily from Germany’s “federal nature” and
the “historical development and codification of German law.” 123
Civil law lends itself toward specialization because often the code is
complicated, requires extensive familiarity, and serves as the
primary source of answers for judges. 124 As such, generalist
experience becomes less efficient compared to specific knowledge
of a particular section of civil code. 125 In Germany, five areas of
law—one being intellectual property litigation—are represented by
independent courts of non-overlapping jurisdiction, each with

119

See von Meibom, supra note 91, and accompanying text.
Jim Patterson, Übung Macht den Meister: How US District Courts can
Better Adjudicate Patents by Learning from Germany’s Specialized Courts,
CASRIP Newsletter 27 (Winter 2000) (https://tinyurl.com/y7gt2ozr).
121
See Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from
the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68 (2005) (quoting
Judge Henry Friendly regarding the complexity of law and the increasing
difficulty of maintaining competence as a generalist judge: “[I]t is altogether
absurd to expect any single judge to vie with an assemblage of law professors in
the gamut of subjects . . . that may come before his court.”).
122
See generally Invalid, supra note 110.
123
Damle, supra note 121, at 1289–90 n.104 (quoting NIGEL G. FOSTER,
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 38 (2d ed. 1996)).
124
Damle, supra note 121, at 1290–91.
125
See generally id.
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specialized judges well-versed in their respective legal code. 126
German judges have more direct control over courtroom
proceedings than their American counterparts as a result of the
inquisitorial system, 127 but the nature of civil law means judicial
decisions in Germany technically have no effect on the law itself,
unlike in the United States.128
Despite these fundamental differences, we need not dismiss the
German experience as foreign and unapproachable. As the Japanese
have recently shown, it is possible to create legal reforms which
respond to the need for increased specialization in a way that still
respects the nature of the current system. Perhaps we can ask some
difficult questions and reconsider the role of juries and generalist
judges in a patent system filled with inefficiencies and power
inequalities.129
V. CONCLUSION
The United States holds democracy as one of its defining values,
and the use of lay juries in its judicial system is a natural
manifestation of that value. Yet, there are certain technical topics
that the average layperson is not well equipped to handle simply
because they have not spent the enormous amount of time required
to become an expert in that field. The United States need not hinder
126

Id. at 1286; see also Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter
Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 31–41 (1981) (summarizing the specific variety of
cases handled in each of the five judicial jurisdictions).
127
Patterson, supra note 120, at 27 (“German judges are granted tremendous
power to conduct research and actively question witnesses . . . German lawyers
watch over the judges’ work and make suggestions of pertinent legal theories, but
are only slightly involved in fact finding, and are highly discouraged from
contacting witnesses before the witnesses have been questioned by judges.”).
128
Id. (“German judges are much less active in shaping laws than they are in
interpreting them; and previous court decisions are not legally binding on
subsequent cases.”).
129
Id. (“The US legal community has traditionally received the notion of
specialization with skepticism and contempt; but given the severe problems in
patent adjudication in the district courts, and the significant costs of patent cases,
now may be the time to put aside old prejudices and seek a higher ground.”).
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itself with tradition when other nations have different and
demonstrably more efficient methods of handling patent trials.
Specialized patent courts and technically trained judges have led to
cheaper, faster patent trials for Japan and several European Union
countries, especially Germany and the United Kingdom. The
specialized, expert-based patent trial methods utilized by these
countries are not incompatible with the United States’ legal system;
it is perhaps the American public’s faith in democracy as a solution
to all administrative issues that serves as the greatest obstacle to the
implementation of these judicial techniques.
Experts undoubtedly make mistakes and are susceptible to
ordinary cognitive biases when forming their judgment. Democracy
is in large part a method of sparing us from abuses of power.
Democracy that ignores knowledge acquired from intense training
and extensive experience in the relevant field of study denies itself
the fruits of specialization.

